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Financial factors and ownership structure are both part of the determinants of corporate 
R&D investment. Considering listed firms in the R&D intensive industries during the 
2000s, this paper examines whether financial factors and ownership structure explain R&D 
investment in Japan. Following the methodology of Brown et al. (2009), which extends the 
dynamic investment model of Bond and Maghir (1994) to R&D investment, we find that 
only small, young firms mainly listed on new emerging markets face financial constraints. 
We also find that large firms finance R&D investment partly from debt. For firms with 
relatively limited assets, however, higher leverage leads to lower R&D investment. Finally, 
we find no evidence that large shareholdings by foreign investors enforce myopic behavior 
on firms in R&D intensive industries. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In Japan domestic physical investment peaked in 1991, dropped sharply in the 
1990s, and remained low even during recovery period in the 2000s. Investment in 
research and development (R&D), on the other hand, has increased continuously, 
surpassing physical investment between 2002 and 2004 (METI, 2009). Currently, the 
scale of R&D and physical investment are at comparable levels in Japan. 
From 1994 to 2004 in the United States, firms that listed recently accounted for a 
large part of R&D investment (Brown et al., 2009). For example, firms listed on the 
market at most 15 years previously accounted for 45.7% of the aggregate R&D in 1998 
and 26.1% in 2004 in the United States. By contrast, in Japan, large mature firms that 
drove the rapid growth from the 1960s to the 1980s are still the main players in R&D 
expenditure. While domestic emerging equity markets have been established since 1999 
and many new firms have gone public, especially in the Information Technology (IT) 
and related industries, firms that went public after 1990 account for only 3% of total 
R&D spending in R&D intensive industries in our sample. In contrast, large mature 
firms whose consolidated assets are more than 500 billion yen account for nearly 80% 
of total R&D spending in R&D intensive industries. For example, Toyota Motor, the top 
corporate R&D investor in Japan, outlaid 890 billion yen in 2006, about 60% of its 
physical investment. The second largest R&D investor, Panasonic, spent 580 billion yen, 
more than its physical expenditure of 420 billion yen. 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine whether financial factors explain the 
relatively limited presence in R&D investment by small, young firms in Japan. 
Following Brown et al. (2009), we apply the dynamic investment model of Bond and 
Meghir (1994) to R&D investment, and examine whether the shift of internal funds can 
explain the change in R&D investment. We do not observe financing constraints on 
R&D investment of firms with larger assets. For small, young firms mainly listed on the 
new emerging markets, however, we observe financing constraints, which is consistent 
with the finding of Brown et al. (2009). On the other hand, we find no relationship 3 
 
between R&D investment and equity finance in firms with relatively limited assets. This 
result contrasts with the theoretical prediction as well as the U.S. case, in which the 
changes in equity finance by young, high-tech firms explain most of the 1994 to 2004 
aggregate R&D cycle (Brown et al., 2009). 
We also examine the role of debt in R&D investment. We extend the work of 
Brown et al. (2009) by focusing on debt in addition to equity finance, since debt is the 
major source of incremental funding for most firms in Japan. Ogawa (2007) investigates 
the relationship between R&D investment and debt in Japan using the sample period 
from 1988-1991 and 1999-2001. He shows that the ratio of debt to total assets had a 
significant, negative effect on R&D investment in the late 1990s, while the effect of the 
debt-asset ratio on R&D investment was insignificant in the late 1980s. 
Using the sample period from 2001 to 2008 focusing on the role of changes in debt 
while Ogawa (2007) focuses on debt level, we find that the coefficient of lagged debt 
and lagged debt squared is significantly negative, as implied by tax-bankruptcy 
specification for firms with large assets. This result implies that large firms finance 
R&D investment at least partly from debt. In contrast, estimation results for firms with 
relatively limited assets show that the coefficient of lagged debt is significantly negative, 
while that of lagged debt squared is insignificant, suggesting that a higher level of debt 
financing leads to lower R&D investment. 
Finally, this paper highlights the effect of increasing foreign ownership on R&D 
investment. One characteristic of the changes in corporate governance structure for 
Japanese firms is the rapid increase of both domestic and foreign institutional investors 
and reduction in cross shareholding since the late 1990s (Miyajima and Kuroki, 2007). 
It is plausible that if investors are myopic and their preferences are biased toward 
immediate dividends, then managers may take into account these myopic investors and 
pay dividends by sacrificing R&D investment (Narayanan, 1985 and Stein, 1989). For 
small firms which face financial constraints, we do not find any evidence that large 
shareholdings by foreign investors enforce myopic behavior. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews R&D 
expenditure in Japan from the late 1990s. Section 3 summarizes the financial structures 4 
 
of R&D intensive firms. Section 4 describes the empirical model and Section 5 reports 
the estimation results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  An Overview of R&D Investment 
 
2.1 Macro Trend and R&D Intensive Industries 
We first overview the trend in R&D expenditures from 1980 based on Figure 1 
from METI (2009). After reaching its peak value of 20 trillion yen in 1991, domestic 
physical investment plunged in the 1990s, to around 13 trillion yen, where it remained 
even during the recovery in the 2000s. On the other hand, R&D expenditure steadily 
increased from 9 trillion yen in 1985 to 12 trillion yen in 2007. Today, R&D investment 
in Japan matches physical investment.
1 
 
== Figure 1 about here == 
 
Table 1 shows industry-level R&D expenditure. Industry classifications are based 
on Securities Identification Code Committee’s 33 sectors (excluding financial sectors) 
(Syoken Code Kyogikai 33 Gyoshu).
2 The sample is all listed firms contained in the 
Toyo Keizai dataset.
3 We did not take R&D spending data from profit-and-loss 
statements since it undervalues R&D spending by not taking into account salaries for 
researchers. Table 1 shows that manufacturers account for 94% of R&D expenditures. 
The electric appliances sector has the largest share of R&D spending, at 38%, followed 
by transportation equipment, at 24%. Chemicals, machinery, precision instruments, and 
information & communication also have high R&D expenditure shares.
4 Looking at 
                                                  
1  According to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (2009), a breakdown of R&D 
spending by corporations in 2007 was as follows: labor costs 39.8%, materials 18.4%, depreciation 
7.3%, leases 0.7%, and other 33.7%. 
2  According to the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities by METI, public 
firms account for 87% of R&D spending. 
3 The data is based on the Kaisha Shikiho (Japan Company Handbook). Branstter (1996) discusses 
the quality of R&D data for Japanese firms. 
4  Among firms in the Information & Communication sector classified according to the Securities 
Identification Code Committee’s 33 sectors, we only look at firms in three major groups; 5 
 
R&D intensity (R&D expenditure/sales), pharmaceuticals is easily the highest, while 
electric appliances and precision instruments have intensities of over 4%. We define 
these seven industries as R&D intensive industries.
5  The total R&D expenditure by the 
seven industries is 12.5 trillion yen, accounting for 87% of the whole sample in the 
Toyo Keizai dataset. 
 
== Table 1 about here == 
 
2.2 R&D Investment by Firm Type 
Figure 2 summarizes the time-series trend of R&D expenditures by the sample 
firms in the seven R&D intensive industries used in the empirical analysis. The average 
R&D spending-asset ratio is stable in the sample period. This is different from the U.S. 
case, where there was a R&D boom in the late 1990s and a decline in the early 2000s. 
While the R&D-asset ratio has been stable at around 4% since the late 1990s, the 
coefficient of variation has been trending upward. 
 
== Figure 2 about here == 
 
The size and age of firms are likely to have influence on their R&D investment 
through their financing conditions. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) argue that size and age of 
a firm are closely related to financial constraints, while the KZ index advocated by 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) is unlikely to be a useful measure of financial constraints. 
We classify sample firms in the 1st or 2nd section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange as 
Large firms if their consolidated assets were 300 billion yen or greater in 1999. We 
classify sample firms in the 1st or 2nd section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange as Small 
                                                                                                                                                  
Communications (37), Information Services (39), and Internet Based Services (40) in Division G: 
Information and Communications by Japan Standard Industrial Classification. 
5 Brown et al. (2009) take the following seven industries in their sample: drugs, office 
and computing equipment, communications equipment, electronic components, 
scientific instruments, medical instruments, and software. It is difficult to compare the 
sample industries in Brown et al. (2009) and the seven industries in this paper given 
different industry classifications. However, one noticeable difference is the absence of 
the transportation equipment industry in the sample of Brown et al. (2009). 6 
 
firms if their consolidated assets were less than 100 billion yen in 1999.
6 Firms are 
defined as Young firms if they went public after 1990 on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 
Mothers, Hercules, or JASDAQ. We do not impose any condition on how long a firm is 
listed to be classified as Large or Small firms. Thus, some firms are classified into both 
Large and Young (or Small and Young) at the same time.
7 Figure 3 shows that most 
R&D spending in our sample is by Large firms, with Young firms accounting less than 
3% in 2006, although their presence in the sample is increasing. In the U.S. high-tech 
industries, young firms accounted for 40% of R&D expenditure in the late 1990s.
8 The 
trend in U.S. R&D expenditure was largely influenced by the behavior of young firms 
from the mid 1990s (Brown et al., 2009). In contrast to the U.S. case, most R&D 
investment in Japan was conducted by mature firms, despite the increase of young firms 
in IT related sectors. 
 
== Figure 3 about here == 
 
3.  Financial Structure of R&D Intensive Industries 
 
Figure 4 describes the financial structure of the sample firms in R&D intensive 
industries. While financial variables fluctuate, R&D expenditure is fairly stable 
throughout the sample period. This tendency continues even after the financial crisis in 
2008, which accompanied the decline in cash flow and increase in debt, as far as 2008 
data is concerned. The dispersion in R&D-asset ratio increased, especially after 2002, 
while leverage has declined. The mean R&D-asset ratio declined slightly, but the 
standard deviation held steady, with the result that the coefficient of variation increased. 
This dispersion of the R&D-asset ratio became more pronounced after the financial 
                                                  
6 The median of total assets for the sample firms is 71 billion yen. We also set 200 
billion yen as a threshold for defining Small firms, and 400 billion and 500 billion yen 
for Large firms in the following analyses and observe similar results (weaker results for 
Small firms with an alternative definition).   
7 For example, a firm with total assets of 50 billion yen that listed on the 1st section of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange in 1995 is classified as a Small and Young firm. 
8 In Brown et al. (2009), a firm is classified as young for the 15 years following the year it first 
appears in Compustat as a listed firm, and is considered mature thereafter. 7 
 
crisis in 2008. 
 
== Figure 4 about here == 
 
Panel 1 of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables of the sample 
firms. All variables except for the foreign shareholding ratio (Foreigner) are scaled by 
beginning-of-period total assets. The total consists of all firms in the sample in the 
seven R&D intensive industries described above. Large firms have a higher R&D-asset 
ratio and less dispersion between firms. Small firms have a lower R&D-asset ratio of 
about 2.9% on average, but have greater dispersion. Young firms have a similar 
R&D-asset ratio to Small firms and greater dispersion compared to the former two 
groups. According to Panel 2 of Table 2, firms in R&D intensive industries reduced 
their debt-asset ratio during the sample period. As a consequence, the debt-asset ratio 
went down from 26% in 1999 to 13% in 2006. Meanwhile, they experienced a rapid 
increase in foreign and institutional shareholdings and a decrease in cross-shareholdings 
or stable shareholdings. The foreign shareholding ratio rose from 6.1% in 1999 to 
13.7% in 2006. 
 
== Table 2 about here == 
 
Observing by firm group, Large firms had a higher debt-asset ratio than other 
groups, with bonds accounting for the majority of debt finance by Large firms in 1999. 
Regarding ownership structure, outsiders held greater shareholdings at Large firms. Two 
important points can be seen in the change of corporate finance and governance 
structure for Large firms in the 2000s.
9 First, Large firms reduced debt rapidly. One of 
our interests after section 5 is how this reduction in debt affected their R&D investment. 
Second, ownership structure also changed rapidly. Foreign and institutional 
shareholding ratios reached 30% and 44%, respectively in 2006. Moreover, the variance 
                                                  
9 Arikawa and Miyajima (2007) investigate the change in corporate finance and governance of 
Japanese firms in the 1990s. 8 
 
in ownership structure declined. The coefficient of variation of foreign ownership 
dropped from 0.68 in 1999 to 0.39 in 2006. The ownership structure of Large firms 
became more homogeneous with respect to outsider-oriented ownership. 
Small firms reduced their debt-asset ratio, which fell from 14% in 1999 to 12% in 
2006. A reduction in bond financing was also evident, and the bond-asset ratio became 
1% in 2006. Regarding outsider shareholdings, Small firms have higher dispersion than 
Large firms. How differences in shareholdings by foreigners affect R&D investment is 
one of the questions considered in this paper. 
Finally, we observe the financial and ownership structure of Young firms. The 
debt-asset ratio of Young firms remained relatively low during the sample period. On 
the other hand, although Young firms finance by stock issue more than mature firms, the 
size is not large. They show the characteristics of entrepreneur firms; director’s stock 
holding ratio is high. The ratio of shareholding by foreigners and institutional investors 
is low compared to Large firms. 
 
4.  The Empirical Model and Data 
 
In this section we explain the empirical specification for the following analysis. As 
in Brown et al. (2009), we apply the dynamic investment model of Bond and Meghir 
(1994) to R&D investment. The empirical model is based on the Euler equation, which 
is derived from the dynamic optimization of investment of a firm under imperfect 
competition with convex adjustment costs.
10 The baseline empirical specification 
including debt finance is as follows. 
 
jt t t jt jt jt jt jt jt jt d D D CF S RD RD RD                       
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where  jt RD  is R&D spending for firm j in time t, 
2
1  jt RD  is the square of R&D 
spending and derived from the existence of a nonlinear adjustment cost,  1  jt S  is sales, 
                                                  
10  Derivation of the estimation equation is referred to Bond and Meghir (1994) or Bond and Van 
Reenen (2007). 9 
 
1  jt CF   is cash flow,    1  jt D is the amount of debt at t-1, and 
2
1  jt D   is the square of debt. 
All variables are scaled by the beginning of period total assets.    is the time effect on 
R&D spending to capture effects such as tax rates;  t  is the time invariant firm effect; 
and  jt   is the error term. We also estimate using the interaction terms of year and 
industry dummies as Brown et al. (2009) to control for an industry specific environment 
that changes yearly. 
According to Bond and Meghir (1994),  1   is positive and greater than 1,  2   
takes an absolute value greater than 1,  3   takes zero under perfect competition and 
takes positive values otherwise. The coefficient of the lagged cash flow,  4   is 
negative. 
The debt terms are included to capture tax-bankruptcy effects. Under the existence 
of bankruptcy costs and a tax advantage of debt, the firm raises debt until the tax 
advantages have been fully exploited. The coefficient of the square of the debt term 
should be negative unless firms are in a situation where the Modigliani-Miller theorem 
does hold. We also add the lagged debt term to the Bond and Meghir (1994) model. 
The specification in this paper has a dynamic panel structure which has a lag of the 
dependent variable as an independent variable. We estimate it using the system GMM of 
Blundell and Bond (1998). Here all independent variables are treated as endogenous 
variables and use t-3 and t-4 independent variables as instruments.
11 
We take financial variables from Nikkei NEEDS, and variables on ownership from 
Nikkei NEEDS-Cges (Corporate Governance Evaluation System). We use consolidated 
data for all variables. We construct an unbalanced panel of publicly traded firms in the 
seven R&D intensive industries during 2001 to 2008. We require firms to have at least 
five R&D observations. Panel 1 of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the 
estimation sample. 
 
5.  Estimation Results 
 
                                                  
11 If there is no serial correlation, instruments dated t-2 can be used, but when the error is MA(1), 
the instruments must be at least dated t-3. 10 
 
5.1 Pooled Sample Estimates 
The pooled sample estimation results are summarized in Table 3. Hansen’s J test 
does not reject the validity of the instruments in any specifications but the one in 
column (1). The coefficient of the lagged R&D spending is significantly positive, but 
larger than one only in column (3). 
 
== Table 3 about here == 
 
We observe that several variables take coefficients different from the theoretical 
predictions. In each regression result, the coefficient for cash flow is positive, although 
it should be negative given the assumption that the firm can raise as much money as it 
wants at a given cost. This positive coefficient is in line with other literature, such as 
Fazzari et al. (1988), and may reflect a liquidity constraint. We also find that the 
coefficient on debt and the square of debt are not significantly negative in the regression 
results.
12  
We find similar results when we include the lagged values of funds raised by new 
stock issues scaled by beginning-of-period total assets (Stk) following Bond and Meghir 
(1994) and Brown et al. (2009). Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 show that the 
coefficients for lagged cash flow are positive but insignificant, and the coefficient of 
debt and the square of debt are not significantly negative, with the exception of the 
lagged debt in column (3). The coefficients of the lagged stock are also insignificant in 
both regression results. In sum, financial factors do not show a clear result, which would 
be caused by the heterogeneity among sample firms with respect to characteristics such 
as size and age. 
 
5.2 Comparison of Large and Small Firms 
To further investigate the effect of financial variables on R&D spending, we split 
the sample into groups by a firm characteristic that is likely to be associated with 
financial constraints. As explained in Section 2, we split our sample into two groups, 
                                                  
12  The coefficient of the lagged square of R&D and lagged Sales is also insignificant. 11 
 
Large and Small, based on firm size. Expecting that the cost of debt finance differs 
based on firm’s size, we compare the regression results between Large and Small firms. 
Table 4 shows the results. We find again that the coefficient for lagged cash flow is 
positive and insignificant for both Small and Large firms. We further examine this 
insignificance in the next subsection. 
For Large firms, we find that the coefficients of lagged debt and lagged square debt 
are significantly negative in column (4) and (8) as implied by tax-bankruptcy 
specifications. This suggests that Large firms finance their R&D investments at least 
partly from debt.
13 For Large firms a one standard deviation (0.049) increase in debt 
scaled by total assets reduces R&D investment by 8%. For Small firms, the coefficient 
of lagged debt is significantly negative, while that of lagged square debt is insignificant 
in each regression result. The relationship between debt and R&D investment is linearly 
negative. Firms with limited assets do not have an optimal leverage ratio, and higher 
leverage leads to lower R&D investment. This result suggests that Small firms are more 
likely to face a higher cost from the marginal increase in debt because of the lack of 
collateralized assets or the greater uncertainty of future profits. This means that the cost 
of debt finance outweighs its benefits as a whole for Small firms. Thus, higher leverage 
monotonically raises the capital cost of R&D investment, with the result that R&D 
investment decreases. For Small firms, one standard deviation (0.054) increase in debt 
scaled by total assets reduces R&D investment by 3%. 
 
== Table 4 about here == 
 
To further explore the relationship between leverage and R&D investment, we 
conduct two additional tests. First, we investigate whether a firm with higher leverage 
on its balance sheet at the beginning of the investment decision is more likely to reduce 
R&D investment at period t when debt finance increases at period t-1. To this end, we 
divide the sample into firms with high and low leverage by median debt-asset ratio at 
                                                  
13  This result holds when using alternative cutoff values such as 400 billion or 500 
billion yen to define Large firms. 12 
 
the beginning of the sample period. When firms increase debt finance at one unit, the 
marginal increase in the cost of debt is likely to be higher for high-levered firms than it 
is for firms with less leverage, because of the higher default probability. This difference 
in marginal cost for debt finance leads to different results between high-levered and 
low-levered firms. Table 5 shows the results. Column (1) and (2) show the results when 
firms have a higher debt-asset ratio at the beginning of the sample period. We find that 
the coefficient of the lagged debt is significantly negative in the regression. On the other 
hand, for low-levered firms at the initial period, the coefficient of the lagged debt term 
and the lagged square debt is insignificant. Thus, for high-levered firms, the increase in 
debt financing leads to a reduction in R&D investment, while the larger debt financing 
does not have any effect on R&D investment for low-levered firms.
14 Among 
high-levered firms, one standard deviation (0.064) increase in debt scaled by total assets 
reduces R&D investment by 4.8%. 
 
== Table 5 about here == 
 
Second, we explore how the negative relationship between the lagged debt and 
R&D investment differs across firms with differing business risks, as measured by the 
number of business units for each firm. We assume here that a larger number of business 
units helps to reduce a firm’s business risk. If debt finance leads to a reduction in R&D 
investment because of the increase in default risk, we would expect to see a weaker 
relationship between the lagged debt and R&D investment in firms with more business 
units. When we introduce the interaction term between the lagged debt and the indicator 
variable that is equal to one if the number of business units within a firm is more than 
four, and zero otherwise, we find that the coefficient of the interaction term is 
significantly positive only for Small firms (the results are not shown in the table). In 
fact, the magnitude of the coefficient is large enough to offset the negative effect of the 
lagged debt on R&D investment. These results suggest that the higher default 
                                                  
14 We also estimate the same model for the high and low levered firms within small firms. The 
results for the lagged debt terms are similar to Table 5. 13 
 
probability for Small firms increases the cost of debt financing, and that is the main 
reason of the negative relationship between debt finance and R&D investment. 
 
5.3 Cash Flow and Financial Constraint   
To explore the presence of financing constraints on R&D investment, we add 
contemporaneous cash flow, which is the standard measure of internal equity financing 
in the financing constraint literature following Brown et al. (2009). 
 
jt t t jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt d D D CF CF S RD RD RD                         
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Table 6 presents the regression results. Column (1) and (2) gives the results for 
Small and Large firms, respectively. In both specifications, the contemporaneous cash 
flow variables have no significant effect, and the coefficients on lagged cash flow terms 
are also not significantly negative. In this specification, the coefficient on lagged debt 
and lagged square debt is significantly negative for Large firms, while only the 
coefficient of lagged debt is significantly negative for Small firms.
15   
 
== Table 6 about here == 
 
To further investigate the sensitivity of R&D investment to contemporaneous cash 
flow, we add firms that are listed on the “emerging markets,” namely JASDAQ, 
Mothers, and Hercules (formerly NASDAQ Japan). These three markets, especially 
Mothers and Hercules, were established for start-up firms. In terms of industry 
distribution, JASDAQ is more diverse and the two newer markets are highly oriented 
toward the IT industry (Arikawa and Imad'Eddine, 2010). Moyen (2004) shows that the 
investment-cash flow sensitivities in the sense of Fazzari et al. (1988) hold only when 
constrained firms do not have funds to match the amount they wish to invest. This 
condition is likely to apply to the firms listed on JASDAQ, Mothers, and Hercules. We 
expect that Small firms, including those listed on emerging markets, are more likely to 
                                                  
15  The results are the same when we use the year dummy in the regression. 14 
 
face severe financial constraints than other firms are. 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 show the results for Large and Small firms with 
firms in emerging markets, respectively. We expect that for Small firms only, the 
contemporaneous cash flow has a significant effect. Consistent with our prediction, we 
find that the coefficient on contemporaneous cash flow is significantly positive for 
Small firms, while for Large firms it is insignificant.
16 We therefore conclude that 
“emerging” firms with a small size are likely to face financial constraints for R&D 
investment, and a marginal increase in internal funds leads to an increase in R&D 
investment. Comparing the results between column (1) and (3), it is clear that firms 
listed on JASDAQ, Mothers, and Hercules face financial constraints for R&D 
investment. This result corresponds to the result for the young American firms in Brown 
et al. (2009). 
We also find that the coefficient on lagged debt and lagged square of debt are both 
negatively significant for Large firms. In contrast, for Small firms, we find no 
significant result in terms of debt-related variables. The result would suggest that Small 
firms, especially start-up firms, who face the financial constraints do not use debt 
finance for R&D investment because it is very costly. 
Finally, we find no significant result for the coefficient of the lagged external equity, 
even when we add “emerging” firms that are listed on JASDAQ, Mothers, and Hercules. 
In the United States, Brown et al. (2009) point out that the supply of equity finance for 
young publicly traded firms in high-tech industries drove much of the R&D boom in the 
1990s. In Japan, we find no robust evidence to support the contention that the stock 
market is the important source of funds for technological development. 
 
5.4 Ownership Structure and R&D Investment 
One characteristic of the changes in corporate governance structure for Japanese 
firms from the late 1990s is the rapid increase of both domestic and foreign institutional 
                                                  
16 The models that strictly follow the Brown et al. (2009) model, namely models that have 
contemporaneous variables for all financial variables (both with and without debt terms), provide 
similar results. 15 
 
investors and reduction in cross shareholding, as shown in Section 3. The question 
naturally arises as to whether this change of ownership structure would influence R&D 
investment or not. One possibility is that myopic investors negatively influence R&D 
investment, which takes a long time to generate revenues (Narayanan, 1985, and Stein, 
1989). If investors are myopic and their preferences are biased toward immediate 
dividends, managers may take into account these myopic investors and pay dividends 
by reducing R&D investment. In this case, firms with more myopic investors are more 
likely to under-invest in R&D.
17  
To study the effect of myopic investors on R&D expenditure, we add the foreign 
shareholding ratio and the interaction term between the contemporaneous cash flow and 
the foreign shareholding ratio. We then estimate the following equation: 
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where  jt FRGN is the foreign shareholding ratio for firm j in period t and   
jt jt CF FRGN   is the interaction of foreign shareholding ratio and cash flow. If foreign 
investors myopically demand excessive dividends, we would expect the interaction term 
to take positive coefficients.   
Table 7 shows the estimation results. We use firms that are listed on the 1st and 2nd 
section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, JASDAQ, Mothers, and Hercules. First, the 
estimation results for Small firms, Column (1) and (2), show that although coefficients 
of foreign shareholding ratios are not significant, their interaction terms with cash flow 
take significantly negative coefficients. For these firms, then, foreign investors 
mitigate the financial constraints for R&D investment.
18 Second, for Large firms, 
columns (3) and (4), we find that the coefficients of foreign shareholding ratios and the 
                                                  
17 It is also possible that investors’ preferences are biased toward high R&D investment, and firms 
overinvest in R&D (Aghion and Stein, 2008). 
18  We also test the institutional shareholding ratio, including both domestic and foreign 
institutional investors, in the same fashion and observe similar, but weaker results, 
both in terms of the magnitude of the coefficients and their significance levels. 16 
 
interaction terms with cash flow are insignificant. 
In summary, we do not find any evidence that large shareholdings held by foreign 
investors enforce myopic behavior on firms. 
 
== Table 7 about here == 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Since the 1990s, young firms that have recently listed on the market have accounted 
for a large part of R&D investment in the U.S. By contrast, in Japan, the large and 
mature firms that drove the Japanese economy during its high growth period are still the 
main players in R&D spending. While domestic emerging equity markets have been set 
up since 1999 and many new firms have listed, firms that went public after 1990 
account for only 3% of total R&D spending in R&D intensive industries. On the other 
hand, large firms with consolidated assets of more than 500 billion yen account for 
nearly 80% of total R&D spending in R&D intensive industries.   
In this paper, we examine whether the financial factor explains the limited presence 
of R&D investment by small, young firms in Japan. We then find that contemporaneous 
cash flow have no statistically significant effect on R&D spending by firms with larger 
assets. For small, young firms mainly listed on new emerging markets, however, the 
coefficient on contemporaneous cash flow is significantly positive. We also find that 
firms with large assets finance R&D investment partly from debt. For firms with limited 
assets, higher levels of debt financing lead to lower R&D investment. 
One characteristic of the changes in corporate governance in Japan was the increase 
of both domestic and foreign institutional investors and reduction in cross shareholding. 
If investors are myopic and their preferences are biased toward immediate dividends, 
then managers may take into account these myopic investors and pay dividends by 
sacrificing R&D investment. To study the effect of corporate governance factors on 
R&D expenditure, we add the interaction term between contemporaneous cash flow and 
foreign shareholding ratio. We find no evidence that large shareholdings by foreign 17 
 
investors enforce myopic behavior on firms in R&D intensive industries. 
Finally, we do not find any positive relationship between R&D investment and 
equity finance in firms with limited assets. This result contrasts with the U.S. case, in 
which changes in equity financing by young high-tech firms explain most of the 1994 to 
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Figure 1: R&D and Physical Investments by Manufacturers 
 
Taken from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Basic Survey of Japanese Business 




R&D inv  Domestic physical inv  Dom+Oversea physical inv 
R&D  inv.   Domestic  phys.  inv.    Domestic + Overseas phys. inv. 21 
 
Figure 2: Trend of R&D Expenditure 
 
The sample consists of firms in the seven R&D intensive industries listed on the 1st or 2nd section of 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange and young firms in the same industries that went public after 1990 on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, Mothers, Hercules, or JASDAQ. The seven industries consist of chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, machinery, electric appliances, transportation equipment, precision instruments, 
and information & communications. The industry classification is based on the Securities 
Identification Code Committee’s 33 sectors (excluding financial sectors) (Syoken Code Kyogikai 33 
Gyoshu). Among firms in the Information & Communication sector, we only look at firms in three 
major groups; Communications (37), Information Services (39), and Internet Based Services (40) in 









































Figure 3: R&D Expenditure by Firm Size 
 
The sample contains firms in the seven R&D intensive industries. Large firms are those listed on the 
1st or 2nd section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange and had consolidated assets of 300 billion yen or 
greater in 1999. Small firms are listed on the 1st or 2nd section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange and 
had consolidated assets of less than 100 billion yen in 1999. Young firms went public after 1990 on 



















Figure 4: R&D Expenditure and Finance 
 





















Table 1: R&D Expenditure by Industry 
 
The sample contains all listed firms in the Toyo Keizai dataset in 2006. The industry classification is 
based on the Securities Identification Code Committee’s 33 sectors (excluding financial sectors) 
(Syoken Code Kyogikai 33 Gyoshu). RD/S is R&D expenditure-sales ratio. SD and CV stand for 
standard deviation and coefficient of variation, respectively. The unit is 100 million yen. 
Sector code Sector name Num. firm Total R&DR&D shareAv. R&D/SSD R&D/S CV
50 Fish., Ag. & Forest. 11 98 0.07% 1.29% 1.96% 1.52
1050 Mining 7 17 0.01% 0.53% 0.75% 1.43
2050 Construction 215 1,045 0.78% 0.24% 0.32% 1.35
3050 Foods 153 2,399 1.78% 1.11% 1.76% 1.58
3100 Textiles & Apparels 79 1,509 1.12% 1.08% 1.23% 1.13
3150 Pulp & Paper 27 307 0.23% 0.83% 0.91% 1.10
3200 Chemicals 215 10,745 7.97% 2.95% 2.35% 0.80
3250 Pharmaceutical 51 10,347 7.67% 29.66% 74.37% 2.51
3300 Oil & Coal Products 13 443 0.33% 1.23% 2.16% 1.76
3350 Rubber Products 21 1,465 1.09% 2.44% 1.22% 0.50
3400 Glass & Ceramics 71 1,283 0.95% 1.59% 1.45% 0.91
3450 Iron & Steel 56 1,633 1.21% 0.63% 0.74% 1.19
3500 Nonferrous Metals 43 1,598 1.19% 1.08% 0.88% 0.81
3550 Metal Products 97 911 0.68% 1.20% 1.14% 0.96
3600 Machinery 247 6,325 4.69% 2.24% 2.27% 1.01
3650 Electric Appliances 309 50,933 37.77% 4.65% 4.55% 0.98
3700 Transport Equip. 106 32,017 23.74% 2.02% 1.86% 0.92
3750 Precision Inst. 53 2,291 1.70% 4.82% 6.46% 1.34
3800 Other Products 116 2,105 1.56% 1.24% 1.48% 1.19
4050 Electric Power & Gas 25 1,349 1.00% 0.41% 0.35% 0.84
5050 Land Transport. 66 412 0.31% 0.05% 0.20% 3.96
5100 Marine Transport. 18 13 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 2.86
5150 Air Transport. 6 5 0.00% 0.44% 0.34% 0.78
5200 Warehousing & Harbor 44 4 0.00% 0.04% 0.15% 3.51
5250 Info & Communication 359 4,791 3.55% 2.28% 5.55% 2.43
6050 Wholesale Trade 387 530 0.39% 0.29% 1.45% 4.93
6100 Retail Trade 384 37 0.03% 0.03% 0.19% 6.54
8050 Real Estate 132 15 0.01% 0.04% 0.23% 5.42
9050 Services 377 228 0.17% 1.38% 10.84% 7.84
Total 3,688 134,854 100.00%  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
The estimation sample contains firms in the seven R&D intensive industries. The seven industries consist of chemicals, pharmaceutical, machinery, 
electric appliances, transportation equipment, precision instruments, and information & communications. The industry classification is based on the 
Securities Identification Code Committee’s 33 sectors (excluding financial sectors) (Syoken Code Kyogikai 33 Gyoshu). Among firms in the Information 
& Communication sector, we only consider firms in three major groups; Communications (37), Information Services (39), and Internet Based Services 
(40) in Division G: Information and Communications by the Japan Standard Industrial Classification. The estimation period is 2001-2008. We classify 
firms on the 1st or 2nd section of Tokyo Stock Exchange as Large if their consolidated assets are 300 billion yen or greater in 1999. We classify firms on 
the 1st or 2nd section of Tokyo Stock Exchange as Small if their consolidated assets are less than 100 billion yen in 1999. Firms are defined as Young if 
they went public after 1990 on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, Mothers, Hercules, or JASDAQ. Outliers in all variables that are three standard deviations 
away from their mean are eliminated from the sample. Firms that have five or fewer observations in the sample period are dropped. All variables except 
for ownership variables are scaled by beginning-of-period total assets. The numbers of firms for ownership related variables are in parentheses in Panel 2. 
 
Panel 1: R&D Expenditure and Finance
Total Large Small Young
Mean SD CV Mean SD CV Mean SD CV Mean SD CV
Obs 5,660 788 2,866 1,330
R&D 0.032 0.025 0.761 0.044 0.024 0.552 0.029 0.022 0.768 0.031 0.027 0.875
Sales 0.938 0.318 0.339 0.942 0.286 0.303 0.932 0.305 0.327 0.935 0.374 0.400
Debt -0.004 0.056 -13.856 -0.003 0.049 -17.608 -0.006 0.054 -9.335 0.001 0.059 42.604
CF 0.059 0.052 0.887 0.071 0.049 0.688 0.056 0.049 0.866 0.055 0.058 1.053
New Share Iss 0.002 0.019 7.794 0.002 0.011 6.228 0.002 0.013 7.180 0.005 0.031 6.338
Foreigner (%) 0.104 0.114 1.094 0.251 0.129 0.512 0.065 0.075 1.162 0.063 0.079 1.259  
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Panel 2: Ownership Structure
Total Large Small Young
1998 2001 2006 1998 2001 2006 1998 2001 2006 1998 2001 2006
Obs 584 595 647 86 88 88 278 297 329 123 120 161
Debt/Assets Mean 0.26 0.20 0.13 0.30 0.23 0.16 0.26 0.20 0.12 0.22 0.15 0.11
SD 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.20 0.16 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.12
Borrowing/Assets Mean 0.21 0.17 0.11 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.22 0.18 0.11 0.20 0.13 0.10
SD 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.19 0.16 0.11 0.18 0.13 0.11
Bond/Assets Mean 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
SD 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04
Foreigner (%) Mean 6.11 7.03 13.74 16.15 20.50 30.32 2.82 3.44 9.15 2.83 3.36 8.36
SD 8.24 9.98 12.38 10.99 13.27 11.84 4.30 5.53 8.25 4.40 5.33 9.20
Inst investors (%) Mean 13.18 14.40 22.89 22.23 31.37 43.91 6.72 7.49 16.93 8.15 12.79 14.01
SD 10.90 14.20 17.30 11.24 14.47 13.49 6.35 8.80 12.82 3.81 10.76 12.64
Cross-holding (%) Mean 13.44 11.42 9.15 12.70 9.52 7.48 13.97 12.11 10.70 6.02 7.18 5.08
SD 7.88 8.21 8.00 7.11 6.97 5.59 8.17 8.58 8.67 3.32 6.83 5.38
Director share (%) Mean 6.28 5.53 4.98 0.61 0.49 0.45 3.42 3.67 3.48 26.93 20.27 15.25
SD 22.26 10.31 9.42 1.73 1.60 1.73 6.09 6.84 6.20 48.42 14.00 13.25  
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Table 3: Estimation Results (Baseline Model) 
 
The dependent variable is R&D expenditure. Estimated by system GMM of Blundell 
and Bond (1998) using independent variables dated t-3 and t-4 as instruments. All 
variables are scaled by beginning-of-period total assets. Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust z-values are in parentheses. Hansen is the p-value of Hansen’s 
J test for over-identification. AC1 and AC2 are the p-values of the Arellano-Bond 
test for first and second order autocorrelation which have a null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced residuals. ***, **, * significant at 
the 1 %, 5 % and 10% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RDt-1 0.996 0.938 1.003 0.938
(13.92)*** (12.16)*** (14.56)*** (12.72)***
RD
2
t-1 -0.24 0.047 -0.328 0.01
(-0.32) (0.06) (-0.45) (0.01)
Salest-1 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(-1.39) (-0.50) (-1.45) (-0.66)
CFt-1 0.014 0.003 0.013 0.006
(1.32) (0.33) (1.41) (0.60)
Debtt-1 -0.019 -0.014 -0.018 -0.013
(-2.07)** (-1.52) (-2.08)** (1.56)
Debt
2
t-1 0.002 0.013 -0.034 -0.031
(0.03) (0.18) (-0.41) (-0.38)
Stkt-1 -0.002 0.01
(-0.08) (0.33)
Year Dummies YES YES
Year*Indust Dum. YES YES
AC1 0 0 0 0
AC2 0.278 0.226 0.305 0.251
Hansen 0.097 0.147 0.125 0.238
Observations 4632 4632 4615 4615  28 
 
Table 4: Estimation Results by Firm Size 
 
The dependent variable is R&D expenditure. Estimated by system GMM of Blundell 
and Bond (1998) using independent variables dated t-3 and t-4 as instruments. All 
variables are scaled by beginning-of-period total assets. The sample is divided by 
firm size in 1999. Large firms are listed on the 1st or 2nd section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange and had consolidated assets of 300 billion yen or greater in 1999. Small 
firms are listed on the 1st or 2nd section of Tokyo Stock Exchange and had 
consolidated assets of less than 100 billion yen in 1999. Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust z-values are in parentheses. Hansen is the p-value of Hansen’s 
J test for over-identification. AC1 and AC2 are the p-values of the Arellano-Bond 
test for first and second order autocorrelation that has a null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced residuals. ***, **, * significant at 
the 1 %, 5 % and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Small Small Large Large Small Small Large Large
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RDt-1 1.036 0.984 1.264 1.18 1.032 0.986 1.238 1.151
(11.82)*** (10.09)*** (7.86)*** (8.10)*** (12.34)*** (10.94)*** (8.23)*** (7.88)***
RD
2
t-1 -1.246 -1.012 -2.358 -2.067 -1.184 -1.029 -2.11 -1.754
(-1.26) (-0.94) (-1.54) (-1.39) (-1.25) (-1.04) (-1.45) (-1.18)
Salest-1 -0.001 0 -0.005 -0.001 0 0 -0.004 0
(-0.36) (-0.15) (-1.74)* (-0.31) (-0.10) (-0.06) (-1.64) (-0.26)
CFt-1 0.009 0.003 -0.002 0.012 0.007 0.005 0.001 0.012
(0.83) (0.28) (-0.16) (0.82) (0.75) (0.47) (0.05) (0.86)
Debtt-1 -0.016 -0.013 -0.021 -0.031 -0.018 -0.016 -0.028 -0.037
(-1.74)* (-1.39) (-1.76)* (-2.93)*** (-2.15)** (-1.93)* (-2.32)** (-3.53)***
Debt
2
t-1 0.017 0.01 -0.115 -0.241 -0.028 -0.04 -0.119 -0.241
(0.24) (0.15) (-1.31) (-2.21)** (-0.47) (-0.70) (-1.29) (-2.24)**
Stkt-1 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006
(-0.31) (-0.26) (-0.21) (-0.15)
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES
Year*Indust Dum. YES YES YES YES
A C 1 000 0000 0
AC2 0.58 0.612 0.433 0.119 0.602 0.637 0.315 0.104
Hansen 0.328 0.516 1 1 0.525 0.775 1 1
Observations 2883 2883 761 761 2866 2866 761 761  
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Table 5: The Effect of Debt 
 
The dependent variable is R&D expenditure. Estimated by the system GMM of 
Blundell and Bond (1998) using independent variables dated t-3 and t-4 as 
instruments. All variables are scaled by beginning-of-period total assets. The sample 
is divided at the median value of the debt-asset ratio in 1999. Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust z-values are in parentheses. Hansen is the p-value of Hansen’s 
J test for over-identification. AC1 and AC2 are the p-values of the Arellano-Bond 
test for first and second order autocorrelation that has a null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced residuals. ***, **, * significant at 
the 1 %, 5 % and 10% level, respectively. 
Above Med Above Med Below Med Below Med
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RDt-1 1.054 1.031 1.028 0.933
(11.56)*** (9.40)*** (10.88)*** (9.25)***
RD
2
t-1 -1.028 -0.88 -0.659 -0.224
(0.98) (0.74) (0.73) (0.23)
Salest-1 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.32) (0.38) (1.94)* (0.53)
CFt-1 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.006
(1.23) (1.16) (0.92) (0.55)
Debtt-1 -0.026 -0.022 -0.018 -0.004
(2.56)** (2.34)** (1.29) (0.28)
Debt
2
t-1 0.023 0.024 -0.012 -0.048
(0.47) (0.47) (0.12) (0.50)
Year Dummies YES YES
Year*Indust Dum. YES YES
AC1 0 0 0 0
AC2 0.253 0.356 0.607 0.597
Hansen 0.033 0.167 0.576 0.212
Observations 2274 2274 2341 2341  30 
 
Table 6: Tests for the Existence of Financial Constraint 
 
The dependent variable is R&D expenditure. Estimated by the system GMM of 
Blundell and Bond (1998) using independent variables dated t-3 and t-4 as 
instruments. All variables are scaled by beginning-of-period total assets. The sample 
is divided by firm size in 1999. Large firms are listed on the 1st or 2nd section of the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange and had consolidated assets of 300 billion yen or greater in 
1999. Small firms are listed on the 1st or 2nd section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
and had consolidated assets of less than 100 billion yen in 1999. Emerging firms 
went public after 1990 on the emerging markets; Mothers, Hercules, or JASDAQ. 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust z-values are in parentheses. Hansen is 
the p-value of Hansen’s J test for over-identification. AC1 and AC2 are the p-values 
of the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order autocorrelation that has a null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced residuals. ***, **, 
* significant at the 1 %, 5 % and 10% level, respectively. 
Small Large Small+Emerging Large+Emerging
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RDt-1 0.983 1.148 0.888 1.156
(10.73)*** (7.66)*** (11.06)*** (8.15)***
RD
2
t-1 -1.036 -1.736 0.066 -1.814
(-1.02) (-1.15) (0.09) (-1.25)
Salest-1 0 0 0.001 -0.001
(-0.26) (-0.22) (0.76) (-0.37)
CF 0.021 0.004 0.046 0.017
(1.32) (0.26) (2.95)*** (1.08)
CFt-1 -0.006 0.009 -0.014 -0.005
(-0.55) (0.60) (-0.94) (-0.36)
Debtt-1 -0.016 -0.037 -0.006 -0.032
(-1.87)* (-3.53)*** (-0.47) (-3.35)***
Debt
2
t-1 -0.037 -0.242 -0.082 -0.208
(-0.66) (-2.26)** (-1.57) (1.98)**
Stkt-1 -0.015 -0.006 -0.029 -0.005
(-0.54) (-0.15) (1.79)* (-0.17)
Year Dummies
Year*Indust Dum. YES YES YES YES
AC1 0 0 0 0
AC2 0.726 0.114 0.955 0.069
Hansen 0.768 1 0.627 1
Observations 2866 761 3848 788  31 
 
Table 7: The Effect of Foreign Investors 
 
The dependent variable is R&D expenditure. Estimated by system GMM of Blundell 
and Bond (1998) using independent variables dated t-3 and t-4 as instruments. All 
variables are scaled by beginning-of-period total assets. The sample is divided by 
firm size in 1999. Large firms are listed on the 1st or 2nd section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange and had consolidated assets of 300 billion yen or greater in 1999. Small 
firms are listed on 1st or 2nd section of Tokyo Stock Exchange and had consolidated 
assets of less than 100 billion yen in 1999. Emerging firms went public after 1990 on 
the emerging markets: Mothers, Hercules, or JASDAQ. Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust z-values are in parentheses. Hansen is the p-value of Hansen’s 
J test for over-identification. AC1 and AC2 are the p-values of the Arellano-Bond 
test for first and second order autocorrelation, which has a null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced residuals. ***, **, * significant at 
the 1 %, 5 % and 10% level, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RDt-1 0.987 0.946 1.318 1.302
(15.74)*** (13.53)*** (9.53)*** (10.49)***
RD
2
t-1 -0.576 -0.376 -2.889 -3.067
(-0.93) (-0.59) (-2.18)** (-2.45)**
Salest-1 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 -0.002
(-0.55) (0.50) (-2.19)** (-0.87)
CF 0.057 0.058 0.006 0.03
(3.19)*** (3.39)*** (0.30) (1.44)
CFt-1 -0.008 -0.012 -0.025 -0.016
(-0.67) (-0.91) (-1.97)** (-1.21)
Debtt-1 -0.009 -0.005 -0.03 -0.038
(-0.8) (-0.51) (-2.88)*** (-3.97)***
Debt
2
t-1 -0.068 -0.075 -0.143 -0.178
(-1.24) (-1.42) (-1.78)* (-1.92)*
Stkt-1 -0.032 -0.033 -0.002 -0.003
(1.98)** (2.25)** (-0.09) (-0.11)
Frgnt-1 0.009 0.008 -0.005 0
(1.48) (1.52) (-0.65) (-0.07)
Frgn*CFt-1 -0.228 -0.215 0.036 -0.043
(2.41)** (2.37)** (0.53) (-0.82)
Year Dummies YES YES
Year*Indust Dum. YES YES
AC1 0 0 0 0
AC2 0.675 0.753 0.478 0.111
Hansen 0.173 0.261 1 1
Observations 3845 3845 787 787
Small+Emerging Large+Emerging
 